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BAR BRIEFS
be imputed to the shipper where the shipper sues a third party tortfeasor,
Vanderplank v. Miller, 1 Moody and Malkin 169 (1828); Duggins v. Watson,
15 Ark. 118, 60 Am. Dec. 560 (1854), the only modern authorities found hold
in accord with the bailee-bailor situation that contributory negligence may
not be imputed. Bower v. Union Pacific R. R., 106 Kan. 404, 188 P. 420
(1920); Cf. Henderson v. Chicago Railways Co., 170 Ill. App. 616 (1912).
Despite this, the court in the instant case felt a distinction was justified
because of the prior payment by the carrier under the statute and professed
to ". . . believe the more just rule to be that contributory negligence of the
carrier is a defense." Historically, there is nothing to indicate that the
question of imputing negligence depends on the allocation of loss between
the bailee and the third party. As is briefly summarized in Comment,
78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1009 (1930), the earlier view of allowing the defense of
contributory negligence was a logical outgrowth of the common law. Originally, the bailee, being in possession could maintain an action and he in
turn was strictly accountable to the bailor. A corresponding doctrine held
the bailor liable for any injuries caused by his bailees. When the bailor
was later given the right to sue if the bailee had not sued, the courts were
quick to accept the doctrine first enunciated in Herlihy v. Smith, 116 Mass.
265 (1874), that a bailor was not liable for injuries to a third party due to
the negligence of his bailee; the 'basis of this doctrine is the lack of control
by the bailor over the bailee. Once suits by the bailor were permitted, a
parallel development of the law was that contributory negligence of the
bailee would bar recovery of the bailor. This doctrine was first repudiated
in New York, L E. & W. R. Co. v. New Jersey Electric R. R. Co., 60 N.J.L.
338, 38 Atl. 828 (1897) and was the beginning of the present rule that the
negligence of the bailee was not a bar to an action by the bailor, against a
third party. It is thus indicated that the decay of the doctrine of imputed
negligence resulted from a dislike of ownership per se being the basis of
liability. The court to reach its conclusion in the instant case turned the
clock back historically to revive the concept of imputed negligence which
has disappeared in the bailor-bailee situation. There certainly is less justification for such a holding in a carrier-shipper situation, as the goods in
question are entirely out of the control of the shipper. In the instant case,
the shipper must apparently hold the amount recovered for the benefit of
the carrier, and the third party tortfeasor has lost a defense of contributory
negligence of the bailee-carrier. This is exactly the situation as to allocation of loss in any bailment and has developed as a policy of the courts to
protect the innocent bailor rather than one of the wrongdoers. It is suggested in a discussion of the instant case in 34 Cal. L. Rev. 769 (1946) that
the court might have protected the third party by simply holding that the
shipper was not the real party in interest; however, once the shipper is
considered the proper party plaintiff, grafting an exception onto the established doctrine denying imputed negligence hardly seems justified.
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Second Year Law Student
TAXATION DUE
PROCESS INJUNCTION
AGAINST
IMPOSITION
OF
GENERAL TAX FOR MUNICIPAL WATERWORKS WHERE No SPECIAL BENEFIT

To TAXED CORPORATION. The Morton Salt 'Co. owns property within the
corporate limits of South Hutchinson, Kansas, the assessed valuation of
which is approximately 46% of the total assessed value of all the property
within the corporate limits. The city issued 'bonds to finance a municipal
waterworks system. Present construction plans bring the system within
three-quarters of a mile of the property owned by plaintiff. Additional cost
to extend the system to plaintiff's property is above the statutory limit
imposed on the city for such improvement. Plaintiff brought suit to invalidate the tax and to secure a preliminary injunction, pending final disposition of the suit to permanently enjoin the city from selling the bonds. On
appeal from an order denying injunctive relief it was held, one judge dissenting, that the order be reversed. A temporary injunction should be

BAR BRIEFS
granted pending the outcome of the original suit, provided the plaintiff
execute a bond in the sum of $25,000. Morton Salt Co. v. City of South
Hutchinson, 159 F. 2d 897 (C.C.A. 10th 1946).
The trial court indicated, by refusing a temporary injunction, that the
plaintiff stood no chance of being successful in the original suit. The circuit
court also expresed grave doubt as to the plaintiff's chances of success, but
found a sufficiently serious question of law presented to ground a temporary
injunction on general equitable principles. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U. S.
813, 49 S. Ct. 256, 73 L. Ed. 972 (1929) ; Love v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,
185 F. 321 (C. C. A. 8th 1911) ; Allison v. Corson, 88 F. 581 (C. C. A. 8th
1898). Apparently -theplaintiff here is attempting to maintain the proposition that the improvement contemplated in the instant case is within an
area of municipal activity where the municipality is precluded by substantive due process from choosing the general tax as a financing mechanism. If a municipality is given taxing power for public purposes, it may
provide a water supply, purchase and operate a plant for such purposes,
incur indebtedness for such purposes or pay therefor from general taxes.
Bank of Commerce v. Huddleston, 172 Ark. 1012, 291 S.W. 422 (1927);
Dulton v. Aurora, 114 Ill. 138, 28 N.E. 461 (1885); Attorney General v.
Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 (1875). General taxes are those laid on all persons
and property of a certain class in a particular state, county, city or other
governmental or territorial division, to meet public expenses. Des Moines
Union Ry. Co. v. Chicago G. TV. Ry. Co., 188 Iowa 1019, 177 N.W. 90 (1920).
To come within constitutional limits, a general tax must be for a public
purpose, and apply with equality and uniformity. State v. Aitken, 62 Neb.
428, 87 N.W. 153 (1901). A public purpose is one which has for its objective the promotion of public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security,
prosperity, and contentment of all inhabitants within a political subdivision.
Green v. Frazier, 44 N.D. 395, 176 N.W. 11 (1920), Aff'd, 253 U. S. 233,
Equality in taxation is accomplished
40 S. Ct. 499, 64 L. Ed. 578 (1920).
when the burden of the tax falls equally and impartially upon all persons
and property subject to it. Sherlock v. Winnetka, 68 Ill. 530 (1873). Uniformity requires that all taxable property shall be alike subjected to the
tax. Chicago, N. W. Ry. Co. v. State, 128 Wis 533, 108 N. W. 557 (1906).
The plaintiff in the instant case objects to the tax largely on the ground
that it is to receive no direct benefits from the improvement; but it is not a
constitutional defense to a tax that the taxpayer is not directly benefited
thereby, or is less benefited than others who pay the same or less tax. Houck
v. Little River Dist., 239 U. S. 254, 36 S. Ct. 58, 60 L. Ed. 266 (1915);
For example, every
Kelly v. Pittsburg&,104 U. S. 78, 26 L. Ed. 658 (1881).
person, including corporations, is bound to pay his proportion of a school
tax, although he has no children; of a road tax, although he never uses the
road. In other words, a general tax cannot be dissected to show that as to
its constituent parts an individual taxpayer receives no benefits. Therefore,
if plaintiff's property may not be taxed for this purpose, it is difficult to
see how the legality of any other tax on its property can be sustained, because it likewise must pay 46% thereof.
Admittedly, most municipalities do not use this method of paying for
public improvements, since, by statute or their charter they may use the
special assessment method, N. D. Rev. Code sec. 40-2238 (1943), whereby
only property specially benefited may be assessed and then not in excess
of benefits received by the improvement.' Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269,
19 S. Ct. 187, 43 L. Ed. 443 (1898) ; State v. Ely, 129 Minn. 40, 151 N. W.
545 (1915) ; Martin v. Tyler, 4 N. D. 278, 60 N.W. 392 (1894). This latter
method is undoubtedly the fairer to the taxpayer and is also more favorable
to the municipality, since assessment bonds issued upon a valid improvement
contract are not subject to the municipality's debt limit. N. D. Rev. Code
sec. 21-0302 (1943).
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